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The term “cheap food policy” has frequently been used as a descriptor for U.S. commodity 
programs by those who contend these payments to farmers ultimately result in lower food costs 
for consumers.  More recently, farm policy has been criticized for contributing to the obesity 
problem in the U.S. by making large quantities of fattening foods widely available and relatively 
inexpensive.  This paper econometrically evaluates the impact of direct government payments to 
farmers from 1960-1999 on the proportion of disposable income consumers spend on food.  The 
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Americans spent just over ten percent of their disposable income on food in 2003.  This amount 
equals the lowest level recorded since 1929, and is well below the peak level of 25.2 percent 
experienced in 1933.  The percentage of disposable income Americans dedicate to food 
purchases has consistently fallen since 1947, and has hovered near ten percent since 1997.  The 
downward trend over time can be observed in Figure 1. 
  This article focuses on a long-asserted source of the declining proportion of consumer 
income devoted to food, U.S. agricultural commodity policy.  For many decades, U.S. farm 
policy has been described as a “cheap food” policy—in the broadest sense meaning the results of 
actions taken by the federal government to affect agriculture include lower retail food prices for 
consumers.  In their textbook Agricultural and Food Policy, a cheap food policy is described by 
Knutson, Penn, and Flinchbaugh (1998) as one that “involves the government overtly pursuing 
policies that hold down the price of food below the competitive equilibrium price.”   
  Cheap food policy remains in the milieu of the debate about federal farm program 
payments.  For example, a recent farm publication editorial stated, “They [farm payments] really 
are a food subsidy assistance in disguise . . . and every person in this county [sic] who buys food 
and eats three squares a day are the beneficiaries of it—U.S. citizens pay far less for food than 
anyone on the planet” (Brandon, 2004).  
  Cheap food policy has also made its way into the recent debate surrounding the nation’s 
emerging obesity problem.  According to the National Center for Health Statistics (2004), the 
proportion of obese adults in the U.S. increased from 14.6 percent in 1971 to 31.1 percent in 
2002.  Many articles in the popular press over the last 18-24 months have been highly critical of 
what their authors contend are the deleterious effects of U.S. agricultural policy concerning 
  2obesity.  In 2003 Pollan asserted, “Absurdly, while one hand of the government is campaigning 
against the epidemic of obesity, the other is subsidizing it, by writing farmers a check for every 
bushel of corn they can grow.”  James Tillotson (2003), Professor of Food Policy and 
International Business at Tufts University, perhaps best encapsulates the arguments for the 
commodity policy-obesity link: 
Yes, public-supported long-active strongly politically backed agricultural policies 
have played a pivotal role in shaping our low-cost commodity supply. Combined 
with our highly efficient food-processing industry, this helps to lower the costs of 
our consumer food.  These conditions have, unintentionally and unexpectedly, 
created one of the environmental preconditions that have allowed many of us to 
become fat—cheap food.   
 
The idea of such a relationship is gaining acceptance, as four first-year medical students recently 
concluded in the Stanford Daily (2004) that, “Specifically, the United States should advocate for 
a gradual phase-out of the existing farm subsidies and shifting to an open market . . . as a 




The term “cheap food policy” has been employed by academics, politicians, and a variety of 
advocates over the years.  The concept has taken on numerous meanings over time, although the 
outcome of low-priced food for a nation’s consumers essentially remains the same.  In the 
postwar book The Farmer and the Rest of Us, for example, importing low-priced food products 
from South America to support an industrial expansion in the U.S. is described as a form of 
cheap food policy (Moore, 1945).  As another example, Peterson (1979) discusses the use of 
export taxes, overvalued currencies, and state controls by the governments of lesser-developed 
countries to depress real food prices for their domestic populations as cheap food policy.  Yet 
  3both of these depictions differ considerably from our analysis of the impact of commodity 
programs on the affordability of food for consumers.   
  In a relatively early reference, Eggert (1947) notes how farmers might oppose receiving 
direct payments in place of price supports because they could view them as a cheap food policy; 
at the time receiving such payments was seen as akin to a form of relief.  
Paarlberg (1982), describing what he labeled the “scarcity syndrome” that arose out of 
the events of the mid-1970s, criticizes three forms of government action taken to maintain low 
food prices: trade embargoes, direct price controls, and management of stocks.  Embargoes 
diminish the nation’s credibility, price controls result in marked price increases upon their 
removal, and liquidating food reserves to depress prices can result in unintended shortages.  
Paarlberg lists several consequences of this cheap food policy in the context of the scarcity 
syndrome: 1) low prices and incomes for farmers through disincentives for production, 2) 
reduced export earnings, 3) loss of export markets, and 4) damage to the U.S. reputation as a 
global trader.   
  In his discussion of the justifications for and failures of farm policies, Moore (1987) 
notes that subsidies are cited as a way to lower food prices for consumers through increases in 
production.  However, he states that “consumers pay the cost of increased production or food 
reserves through higher taxes.”  Furthermore, he explicitly states the programs do not reduce 
food prices for consumers.   
Tweeten (1995) dismisses the contribution of commodity programs toward improving 
economic efficiency in his critique of their most common justifications.  He contends the reasons 
for the decline in the proportion of consumer income spent on food over the last six decades 
include the increase in real consumer income and the improvements in agricultural 
  4productivity—influenced primarily by “public and private investments in research, education, 
extension, and infrastructure.” 
Beach, Boyd, and Uri (1997), in their assessment of land values in the absence of direct 
payments, develop a computable generalized equilibrium model that finds total output would be 
reduced by 0.18 percent annually.  Output of program crops would be reduced 14 percent, and 
overall agricultural output would fall 4.39 percent.  The reduction in total output reflects a 
decrease in output in the food and tobacco sector of 0.55 percent because of the higher prices 
associated with the elimination of direct payments.   
Knutson, Penn, and Flinchbaugh (1998) assert the case for a cheap food policy could be 
made throughout the period USDA maintained its target price-deficiency payment program 
because the program stimulated production, leading to increases in supply that caused lower 
commodity prices.  However, USDA also established production controls for much of this same 
period, as on average almost 20 percent of U.S. cropland remained out of production in the five 
decades following World War II (Orden, Paarlberg, and Roe, 1999).  Knutson, Penn, and 
Flinchbaugh also state any link between farm programs and food prices was essentially broken in 
1996 by a farm bill that eliminated deficiency payments and replaced them with a system of 
decoupled payments.  Yet since 1985 USDA has maintained a system of loan deficiency 
payments which essentially guarantees producers a minimum price for all of their production of 
program crops.   
More recently, Morrison Paul and MacDonald (2003) found that over the period they 
examined, 1972-1992, agricultural materials declined as a share of food processor costs, as did 
the sensitivity of food prices to farm prices.  Furthermore, they found a total increase in food 
processing costs of 4.17 percent from 1982-1992 with essentially no contribution from 
  5agricultural materials.  This occurred as a result of the decrease in agricultural materials cost as a 
share of total costs and a negligible increase in inflation.  Finally, Babcock has stated his 
unpublished analysis demonstrates the price of corn and soybeans would increase by no more 
than five to seven percent without government subsidies (Fields, 2004).  Furthermore, Babcock 
notes, “A five- to seven-percent increase in the price of corn would lead to, at most, a one-




The existence of a cheap food policy is most frequently and consistently promoted by 
proponents of commodity programs as a prime benefit and consequently a justification.  
Commodity programs keep production resources in agriculture, resulting in surplus production 
and inefficiency (Shoemaker, Anderson, and Hrubovcak, 1990).  Further, not only are these 
resources impeded from moving to other sectors of the economy, they remain dedicated to the 
production of crops covered by the commodity programs.  In order to clear the market of the 
surplus production, equilibrium prices for these commodities must fall.  An effective cheap food 
policy would mean lower farm-level prices for these raw commodities would result in less 
expensive food products at the retail level for sale to consumers.   
  However, acceding to cheap food policy presents challenges at the farm level in the long 
run.  Shoemaker, Anderson, and Hrubovcak (1990) state that gains to farmers in the short run 
from payments are lost because the agricultural sector adjusts by capitalizing the expected 
program benefits into land values.  They note that because the value of land is for the most part 
based on the income it can generate, government payments increasing that income increase the 
land value and the landowner’s wealth.  Moore (1987) also states those who actually benefit in 
  6the long run are those who owned farm land before the enactment of a farm program or 
enhancements to an existing program.  Shoemaker, Anderson, and Hrubovcak (1990) estimate 
land prices would be 15-20 percent lower without government programs.  The CGE model 
developed by Beach, Boyd, and Uri (1997) for 1988 found land prices would fall about 14 
percent without direct payments.  Under the 1996 farm bill, estimates of inflated land prices were 
as high as 20 percent (Barnard, 2001).  Over time, therefore, as land prices and rents rise the cost 
of production increases. 
  Figure 2 depicts the immediate effect at the farm level of a loan program coupled to 
production.  Under the current regime, a loan rate acts as an effective floor on all of a farmer’s 
current production of a particular crop.  The first panel of Figure 2 illustrates the farmer’s 
response when the market price is below the loan rate.  Production increases in response to the 
higher effective price created by the loan rate, moving from a1 to a2.  As each farmer in the 
industry responds to the loan rate, the quantity supplied increases.  Additionally, the potential to 
earn economic profits attracts new entrants, causing supply of the crop to increase.  This change 
is reflected by the shift in the supply curve for the industry from S1 to S2 in the second panel of 
Figure 2.  Total output for the industry increases from Q1 to Q2.   
Figure 3 illustrates how the initial response to the loan rate becomes tempered in the long 
run as farmers and landowners recognize the land can produce more income.  The figure assumes 
the value of the payments becomes capitalized and as a result land prices and rental rates 
increase.  Higher land charges increase the farmer’s costs of production, as the average cost 
curve shifts from AC1 to AC2. in the first panel of Figure 3.  The farmer’s marginal cost of 
production increases and this curve moves from MC1 to MC2.  The parallel shifts of these curves 
reflect an assumption that changes to the costs of inputs are scale-neutral.  Correspondingly, 
  7output falls from a1 to a2, and the farmer earns zero economic profit.  As each farmer in the 
industry reduces output and other farmers exit the industry, the supply curve for the industry 
shifts from S1 to S2 in the second panel of Figure 3.  Industry output falls from Q1 to Q2, 
returning to the level that existed prior to the introduction of the loan rate program.  Again, this 
movement follows from the assumption that changes to the costs of inputs in the industry are 
scale-neutral.  Additionally, these figures abstract away from risk aversion and any uncertainty 
regarding the future of government payments. 
In sum, the introduction of a loan rate above the market price causes farmers in the 
industry to increase their output and new farmers to enter in attempts to capture economic profits 
in the short run.  However, landowners recognize the increase in income their land can generate 
because of the loan rate program, and they attempt to capture this additional income by raising 
the price of land and rental rates.  Over time, the value of loan payments becomes capitalized in 
the cost of farm land.  Higher land costs result in higher average production costs for farmers, 
who either reduce their output or exit the industry.  The industry output falls and supply reverts 
from a short-run increase to its original level.  The industry again earns zero economic profit 
over the long-run in the presence of the loan program under the competitive framework. 
 
Data and Methods 
 
We test whether direct payments to producers contribute significantly to the proportion of 
disposable income devoted to food expenditures.  The reason the percentage of disposable 
income spent on food is the variable of interest in our study is primarily due to its predominance 
as a measure of food cost.  Furthermore, in general, advocates of cheap food policy refer to the 
commodity title of the farm bill as such.  The variable is constructed as the ratio of the dollar 
  8expenditures on food to disposable income, so that the dependent variable is a function of the 
supply and demand for food and disposable income.  Data on the proportion of disposable 
income spent on food are obtained from the Economic Research Service (ERS) of USDA.  Forty 
observations are utilized in the data set from 1960 through 1999.  These data include purchases 
of food from grocery stores and retail outlets, as well as food produced and consumed on farms, 
because this value is reflected in personal income.  Meals and snacks purchased away from home 
are also included.  USDA’s definition of disposable personal income includes the value of food 
produced and consumed on farms as noted, as well as government transfer payments such as 
food stamps and supplements to wages and salaries including employers’ contributions to Social 
Security and Medicare.   
We employ total factor productivity in agriculture in the model as a measure of changes 
in technology, another important variable affecting the affordability of food because it lowers 
production costs and equilibrium prices.  As such, we expect advances in technology to have a 
negative impact on the percentage of disposable income spent on food, as improvements should 
make food more affordable by shifting the supply curve to the right.  Data are also obtained from 
ERS on this measure of agricultural productivity.  Their index of total factor productivity has 
increased more than two-and-a-half times since 1948.  The lack of availability of more recent 
data prevents the model from incorporating additional years through 2003.  Additionally, the 
remarkable increases in crop yields that have taken place over the same period, as evidenced by 
the record harvests USDA forecasts for corn, soybeans, and cotton in 2004, reflect the 
importance of this variable (Abbott, 2004).   
The total level of consumer income is included in the model because we expect it to 
affect the proportion of income spent on food.  The variable is constructed as a per capita 
  9disposable income variable, and as income rises over time, the proportion spent on food should 
decline ceteris paribus.  Thus, this variable is hypothesized to be negative.  USDA data on 
disposable income are divided into population data from the U.S. Census Bureau to create the 
variable.  These data are adjusted for inflation to 2000 dollars using the Consumer Price Index 
for all items, which uses a base period of 1982-84. 
The model includes an annual calculation of a farm-to-retail price spread from USDA 
because the food commodities purchased at the retail level by consumers reflect the value added 
to raw farm commodities.  The farm-to-retail spread is expected to be positive because increased 
food processing raises the proportion of disposable income spent on food (Gardner, 1975).  The 
farm-to-retail spread data acquired from ERS are based on USDA’s calculation of its market 
basket of foods produced on farms, which is weighted according the quantities purchased by 
consumers during the base period of 1982-84.  ERS converts this spread to an index because 
current price data are multiplied by quantities from the base period instead of current quantities.  
Thus, as with per capita disposable income, these data are multiplied by the Consumer Price 
Index using 2000 as a base year. 
Finally, direct payments are included as an independent variable in the model to test the 
hypothesis of cheap food policy.  If direct payments to farmers in fact generate cheaper food, 
then they should have a negative effect on the percentage of disposable income spent on food.  
Direct payments should stimulate production, shifting the supply curve to the right, ultimately 
lowering the real cost of food to the consumer.  Annual data on direct payments to farmers are 
also obtained from ERS.  These data include payments on program crops as well as conservation 
payments
1.  As with other monetary data used, these annual payments are also expressed in 2000 
dollars by using the Consumer Price Index.   
  10Model and Results 
 
Following our interest in the percentage of disposable income spent on food (XF), we use 
this calculation as the dependent variable in an autoregressive AR(1) model, which employs the 
Yule-Walker method to correct for the presence of autocorrelation:        
    t t t t t t t v DP FRS PDI TFP XF + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0 α α α α α    (1) 
The advantage of using the Yule-Walker method is the retention of the first observation from the 
data.  Initially the ordinary least squares method was utilized, but the results of the Durbin-
Watson d test precipitated the use of an AR(1) model.  The five independent variables in Eq. (1) 
include, in order, total factor productivity, per capita disposable income, farm-to-retail spread, 
and direct payments to farmers.  These variables are all given for year t.   
All independent variables in the model have the expected sign, reflecting their 
hypothesized impacts on the percentage of disposable income spent on food.  Each independent 
variable with the exception of direct payments is significant.  This implies that while the direct 
payments variable has the assumed sign, this effect cannot be statistically distinguished from 
zero
2. 
  The per capita disposable income variable is the only independent variable significant at 
the one percent level.  This is not unexpected since consumer incomes have steadily increased as 
standards of living have improved considerably in the years following World War II.  The fact 
the farm-to-retail spread variable is positive and significant is also not surprising given the rising 
value-added component of retail food.  The significance of total factor productivity in agriculture 
as an independent variable is anticipated because the increases in agricultural efficiency over the 
last several decades have reduced per unit costs of production.   
  11Table 1 presents the results of the AR(1) model described in the previous section.  In 
understanding these results, an additional reason direct payments do not significantly impact 
consumers’ food expenditures can be observed in the relative size of farm subsidies compared to 
the dollars U.S. consumers spend on food each year.  Figure 4 depicts direct payments to farmers 
and food expenditures since 1960 in 2000 dollars.  Since 1960, this level has averaged 1.1 
percent and has not exceeded 2.8 percent.  In 2003, direct payments were approximately 1.7 
percent of consumer food expenditures, which totaled almost $950 billion in nominal dollars. 
  Elasticities calculated by the model for each independent variable are also included in 
Table 1.  The largest elasticity is for the disposable income variable with an absolute value of 
0.655, indicating not only its influence in the model but how much rising consumer incomes 
have been responsible for increasing the affordability of food over the last forty years.  The next 
largest elasticity absolute value of 0.297 is for the farm-to-retail spread variable.  The increasing 
value-added component of food products contributes to the sensitivity of the relationship 
between the farm-to-retail spread and the dependent variable, as the farm value becomes a 
smaller proportion of the total value of food products.  The elasticity value of total factor 
productivity is the next largest absolute value of 0.097, reflecting the importance of 
technological change in increasing the supply of food.  This variable might be expected to have a 
larger elasticity value, but the relationship between the production technology and the 
affordability of food is not as direct as the previously discussed variables.  However, 
technological change remains an important factor because of its impact on the supply of 
agricultural commodities.  Finally, we note the direct payments variable, which is not significant 
in the AR(1) model, has a very small elasticity with an absolute value of 0.00495. 
  12The fact the model does not find evidence of a cheap food policy at least since 1960 is 
consistent with the historical development of U.S. farm programs.  These programs were 
initiated during the Great Depression to provide assistance to farmers whose disappearing 
incomes left them destitute.  The number of farmers at that time, and even in 1960, was much 
greater than today.  The programs were designed to increase the incomes of farmers, not to 
reduce the costs of retail food products to consumers.  Indeed, the contribution of direct 
payments to net farm income is well known throughout agriculture.  Since 1960 all direct 
payments to farmers have on average comprised over 20 percent of net farm income as measured 
by ERS.  In 1983, the year of the highest proportion, they accounted for over 65 percent of net 
farm income.  The percentage has also increased in recent history, as the average from 1960 to 
1980 was 15 percent; since 1980 the average has approached 28 percent.  Figure 5 depicts net 
farm income and direct payments to farmers from 1960 to 2003. 
Additionally, the existence of supply controls throughout much of the history of U.S. 
farm policy runs counter to the notion of cheap food policy, as these mechanisms attempted to 
reduce the differential between market prices for farm commodities and federal price supports.  
These policy actions to mitigate the distortions created by commodity programs were not 
consistent with a goal of reducing retail food prices.   
  The downward trend in the proportion of consumer disposable income spent on food has 
continued since 1996, when the decoupling of farm programs began.  This event alone has made 
justifying the existence of a cheap food policy more difficult, as noted by Knutson, Penn, and 
Flinchbaugh (1998), although the retention of a loan deficiency payment program maintains 
effective price floors for all production of program crops.   
  13  Tweeten (1995) notes how half of production agriculture does not receive assistance from 
commodity programs (livestock, forages, fruits, vegetables), yet remains as abundant and 
efficient as that of program crops.  He states, “Consumers do not anguish over shortages of 
tomatoes, potatoes, eggs, broilers, and other commodities not under government control.”  Our 
results are consistent with this contention. 
 
Implications and Conclusions 
 
  The results of this study are perhaps most applicable to the debate over the future of 
federal commodity policy.  As noted in the introduction, the cheap food policy idiom continues 
to be employed by advocates of existing farm programs, including farmers, interest groups, and 
farm state members of Congress.  However, our findings indicate consumers and taxpayers 
should be wary of these pronouncements.  The results indicate that because the capitalization of 
direct payments into the cost of land essentially mitigates any significant impact on retail food 
prices, the true beneficiaries of farm programs tend to be landowners.  In addition to our 
statistical findings, the sheer magnitude of consumer expenditures on food relative to direct 
payments to farmers indicates how little these payments should be expected to influence the 
affordability of food.  However, direct payments to farmers have become responsible for an 
increasingly larger proportion of net farm income over time, and perhaps this situation 
encourages farm interest groups to advocate the continuation and expansion of commodity 
programs for reasons that include their ostensible impact on retail food prices. 
  Our results may also clarify the often confusing arguments surrounding the nation’s 
obesity problem.  As discussed previously, many social advocates insist on implicating farm 
commodity programs as at least partially responsible for this predicament by making low-cost, 
  14high-fat food products easily available to consumers.  Many of these critics believe eliminating 
these programs would remedy much of the obesity problem.  However, our findings indicate this 
is a largely unsubstantiated argument.  Payments to farmers are not found to significantly 
influence the affordability of retail food products, particularly not on the scale suggested by 
some public health advocates.  Nonetheless, the mix of crops produced as a result of government 
support remains a distinctly separate issue from this study.  The results are also consistent with 
recent work on the relationship between technological change and rising obesity rates, both on 
the supply side and the demand side through the reduction in more labor-intensive employment 
(Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2002; Philipson and Posner, 1999).  Hence, the ability to remove 
commodity programs from the discussion of the U.S. obesity problem would seem beneficial to 
all parties. 
  In the continuing public debate over the design of U.S farm policy, proponents of 
commodity programs delineate numerous justifications (see Tweeten).  Similarly, several sources 
are cited by critics as contributing to an environment that leads to a significant obese population, 
commodity programs among them.  The lack of evidence found in this study for a significant 
role for direct payments indicates much of the discussion is misplaced.  Direct payments are 
shown to be a negligible factor in shifting the long-run supply curve for agricultural commodities 
to the right.  Rather, increases in consumer income and advances in technology that improve 
agricultural productivity are shown to be more significant in their effects on the affordability of 
retail food products.  Debate over public investments to improve such technologies and 
infrastructure would seem to be more appropriate.   
  15Endnotes 
 
1 “Direct payments” as used in this article refer to all payments directly received by farmers for 
which USDA has collected data for many decades.  This is not a reference to the specific system 
of fixed, decoupled payments to farmers established by the 2002 farm bill known as direct or 
fixed direct payments.  These payments could not be included in this analysis since no data after 
1999 are incorporated.   
2 The model was also estimated by modifying the direct payments variable to incorporate a three-
year moving average.  Transforming this variable allowed for an alternative approach to 
measuring expected direct payments.  However, the results of estimating the model with this 
variable are very similar to those in Table 1.  In fact, direct payments become less significant 
with the inclusion of the three-year moving average.   
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Figure 1.  Percentage of U.S. disposable income spent on food, 1933-2003. Source: USDA 
 ERS. 
  19$/unit  $/unit






  a1 a 2  Q1 Q 2 
Acres 
 
Figure 2.  Short-run output effect of a loan program. 
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Figure 4.  Total U.S. food expenditures and direct government payments to farmers,  


































Figure 5.  Direct government payments to farmers as a share of net farm income, 1960- 
  2003. Source: USDA-ERS. 
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Total Factor Productivity  -0.018*
(0.0103) -0.09706 




Farm-to-Retail Spread   0.0002*
(0.0001) 0.29717 
Direct Payments (billion $)  -0.0000932
(0.000145) -0.00495 
R
2  0.987 n/a 
aNumbers in parentheses are standard errors.  Statistical significance at the  
α = 0.05 level is indicated by *; significance at the α = 0.01 by **. 
 
Table 1.  Percentage of disposable income spent on food AR(1) model results. 